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THE INSURANCE TRUST
THE INSURANCE TRUST AS NON-TESTAMENTARY
DISPOSITION
By ORVILLE F. GRAHAME*O NE of the problems that is most often raised in connection
with the life insurance trust is whether it is a testamentary
disposition and should therefore be attested in accordance with
the requirements of the statute of wills.' As a business matter
it is generally not so attested, and thus the question involves the
basic validity of millions of dollars of life insurance now held in
trust.2  The question does not have reference to funds held under
the options of settlement contained in insurance policies as these
options create a debt and not a trust3 but rather refers to policies
payable to a trustee as beneficiary or assignee.
*Of the New York and Iowa bars; associated with The Guardian Life
Insurance Company of America.
'For other discussions of this problem, see Phillips, Life Insurance
Trusts, (1933) 81 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 284, 408; Davis, The Statute of
Wills and Life Insurance, (1931) 5 Ass'n of Life Insurance Counsel Pro-
ceedings 203; Horton, The Testamentary Nature of Settlements of Life
Insurance Elected by the Beneficiary, (1931) 17 Corn. L. Q. 72, 77; Horton,
Life Insurance Trust Handbook (1933) 22; Scott, Cases on Trusts, 2d
ed., 802; Fraser, Personal Life Insurance Trusts in New York, (1930) 16
Corn. L. Q. 19, 30; Yost, Some Problems Relating to Life Insurance
Trusts, (1930) 4 Ass'n of Life Insurance Counsel Proceedings 567; Peter-
son, The Assignment Route or Beneficiary Route to Life Insurance' Trusts,
(1931) Proceedings of the Legal Section American Life Convention 58;
note (1933) 46 Harv. L. Rev. 818. A case involving this problem was
argued before the supreme court of the Ames Competition of the Harvard
Law School, and a copy of the Briefs and Record were kindly loaned to
the writer by the editor of the Harvard Law Review. The Record is
dated November 19, 1932.
-In 1929 it is said that more than two per cent or $2,500,000,000 of
American life insurance was in trust. Scully and Ganse, Business Life
Insurance Trusts 29. At the end of 1930 about four per cent or $4,000,-
000,000 was held in trust. (1932) 45 Harv. L. Rev. 896. Due to the present
economic situation it may be assumed that there has been a decrease in
this amount.
3Vance, Insurance, 2nd ed., 609; Horton, Power of an Insured to Con-
trol the Proceeds of his Policies 49; Bogert, Some Recent Developments
in the Law of Trusts, (1929) 23 Ill. L. Rev. 749, 754; note (1927) 36 Yale
L. J. 394; Danziger, Does the Rule Against Perpetuities, and Do Statutes
Modifying that Rule, Affect Life Insurance Policies and Their Proceeds,
(1930) 4 Ass'n of Life Insurance Counsel Proceedings 467. In some states
insurers are permitted by statute to be trustees. Vance, Insurance, 2nd
ed., 609. Some writers say a trust exists. Madden, Wills Trusts and
Estates 82; Van Hecke, Insurance Trusts, The Insurer as Trustee, (1928)
7 N. C. L. Rev. 21. See also New York Life Ins. Co. v. O'Brien, (D.C.
Mich. 1927) 27 F. (2d) 773; (1929) 77 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 430; Cronbach
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The view that the life insurance trust is a testamentary dis-
position of property is based upon the indisputable fact that in
many cases the insured reserves many rights to himself while pur-
porting to create a title in the trustee. If title is transferred by
assignment, there is the possibility that such assignment is condi-
tioned to take effect only if the insured predeceases the trustee-
assignee. If the beneficiary method is used, a difficulty arises by
reason of the many reservations of rights to the insured, such as
the right to revoke the trust and to change the beneficiary, or to
get the cash, loan or other value. Along with this reservation of
rights by the insured-settlor is the further fact that the trustee,
it would seem, is given very little title to the so-called trust prop-
erty and has no important duties during the lifetime of the insured.
On the death of the insured a fund comes into the hands of the
trustee, free from all but the trust restrictions, and it is debated
whether this is in effect a testamentary disposition. Cases are
cited, and justifiably so, which hold that an individual cannot pre-
tend to declare property in trust and retain all dominion over
such property.
Much of the confusion that has developed is due to the failure
to recall that the life insurance trust is not a new device and the
failure to appreciate that the development of the rights of a third
party beneficiary under a life insurance policy has been somewhat
unique and decidedly circuitous. A brief account of the history
of the insurance trust and the emergence of the rights of the third
party beneficiary will assist materially in an understanding of the
problem involved.
While the life insurance trust as a regular commercial enter-
prise has been a development in the United States since 1920,4
it is as a matter of fact about as old as the institution of life in-
surance itself. The trust institution antedates 5 the statute of uses
enacted in 1535. The trust concept was well accepted in America
prior to 1800.7 Life insurance developed after the trust, and the
trust arrangement no doubt was soon employed in connection with
the new form of property based on contract. In 1706 an attempt
v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., (1926) 153 Tenn. 362, 284 S. W. 72; (1927) 36
Yale L. J. 394.
4Hanna, Some Legal Aspects of Life Insurance Trusts (1930) 78 U.
of Pa. L. Rev. 346; Scully and Ganse, Business Life Insurance Trusts 26.
5Bogert, Trusts 9.
627 Henry VIII, ch. 10.
7Bogert, Trusts 15.
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was made in England by the Amicable Society for a Perpetual
Assurance Office to offer insurance, but the first life insurance
offered on a scientific basis was by the Equitable Assurance Society
of London established in 1762.8 There is a record of a life in-
surance policy having been placed in trust on April 23, 1787, 9 and
it is not likely that this was the first life insurance trust.
There are a number of English and Irish cases involving life
insurance trusts decided prior to 1850. The case of Glynn v.
Locke' ° decided in 1842 involved a trust dated September 27, 1808.
It was declared in another Irish case in 1854 that "it is at present
one of the most ordinary arrangements in marriage settlements to
have a policy of assurance effected to secure some portion of the
settled fund, and to have that policy vested in the trustees on
certain specific trusts."", An English case decided in 1889,
Bridger v. Deane,12 involved a funded insurance trust dated March
20, 1834, and the policy was issued in 1830.
Life insurance didn't get under way until about 1850 ' 3 in the
United States, but it may be assumed that very soon thereafter
the trust arrangement was used in connection therewith. The
supreme court of Maine in 1878 had before it a case 14 involving
a policy dated January 1, 1866, payable in trust, and this may
possibly be as old a life insurance trust arrangement as there is a
record of in the United States.' 5 That the life insurance trust
was employed again and again in cases where it was needed is
evidenced by the numerous cases involving policies payable in trust
adjudicated by the courts of last resort of the several states.'6 In
sVance, Insurance, 2nd ed., 22.9Courtney v. Ferrers, (1827) 1 Sim. 137, 5 L. J. 0. S. Ch. 107. This
policy was issued by the Equitable Assurance Office.
10(1842) 5 Ir. Eq. 61.
"Ford v. Ryan, (1854) 4 Ir. Ch. 342.
12(1889) 42 Ch. D. 9, 61 L. T. 492, 37 W. R. 786.
"3Vance, Insurance, 2nd ed. 22.
14Cables v. Prescott, (1878) 67 Me. 582.
15A trust dated June 13, 1869, with what is now the Girard Trust Com-
pany as trustee, has been mentioned as the oldest heretofore known life
insurance trust. Hanna, Some Legal Aspects of Life Insurance Trusts,
(1930) 78 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 346; Scully and Ganse, Business Life Insur-
ance Trusts 26.
16Contrary to the opinion of some, there are a considerable number
of cases, approximately a hundred, which involve the life insurance and
trust relationship. More than half of the state jurisdictions have passed
on the life insurance trust. One of the first American cases was that of
Bond v. Insurance Co., (1873) 9 Phila. (Pa.) 149. The supreme court of
California had a life insurance trust before it in 1877 in the case of Silvey
v. Hodgdon, (1877) 52 Cal. 363. Space will not permit citing other cases
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fact, it is entirely clear that the life insurance trust, about which
there has been much concern recently, preceded the development
of the American doctrine of the rightsof the third party bene-
ficiary under a life insurance policy..
7
With few exceptions, which will be noted later,' the life in-
surance trust has been enforced by the American courts, 19 and
where the question has been raised the trust has been held to be
non-testamentary. 0  It was when the trustee took the position of
payee under the modern policy, with its reservation of rights to
the insured, a position generally held by a donee beneficiary, that
question was made as to whether the trustee possessed any title to
a res upon which to predicate a trust. To answer this problem it
is necessary to determine the nature of the rights, if any, of a
third party beneficiary during the lifetime of the insured.
It would seem that when life insurance first developed in Eng-
land the policy was owned by the insured and was payable in
effect to his estate.2' One of the most natural steps for the in-
sured to take was to assign the policy in trust for the benefit of
persons he cared to provide for. As was stated previously, this
was commonly done in marriage settlements.2 2 The English
people engaged much in shipping, and their insurance followed
the development of marine insurance.- While there is evidence
that wager policies, based on no interest in the assured, were not
uncommon, it was soon declared that life insurance policies must
be upon the lives of those in whom the one effecting the insurance
had an insurable interest, 24 as he might have an insurable inter-
est in a cargo. In such cases the life insurance contract was made
between the company and the person possessing the insurable
interest, who became the beneficiary. But this party was not a
third party donee beneficiary but rather an owner beneficiary be-
dealing with the trust, except those having a particular bearing on the
testamentary problem.
'
TThe Hume Case, which laid the foundation for the rights of a third
party beneficiary, was not decided until 1888. Central Nat'l Bank v.
Hume, (1888) 128 U. S. 195, 9 Sug. Ct. 41, 32 L. Ed. 370.18lnfra notes 58 and 59.
19Supra note 16.
2 See cases discussed subsequently in this article.
21The money paid by the Amicable Society for a Perpetual Assurance
Office organized in 1706 was paid to the representatives of each member
dying. Vance, Insurance, 2nd ed., 22.22Ford v. Ryan, (1854) 4 Ir. Ch. 342.
23Vance, Insurance, 2nd ed., 14, 15.
34Vance, Insurance, 2nd ed., citing 19 Geo. II, ch. 37, and 14 Geo. III,
ch. 48.
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cause he was a party to the contract and paid the consideration
therefor.
Life insurance was introduced into the United States at a
time when this was the status of the beneficiary's rights. In Bliss
on Life Insurance published in 187225 it was stated that in the
opinion of the author, though there were no cases, the United
States courts would hold a life policy to be an irrevocable trust,
although a different rule prevailed in England. Professor Vance
cites Connecticut, New Jersey and Louisiana as holding in 1871,
without the aid of statutes justifying previous decisions in other
states, that the interest of a donee-beneficiary was vested and
could not be defeated by the insured who was the promisee under
the contract. 26  Mr. Boughton cites Indiana and Minnesota as
being the first states to adopt the view held by Mr. Bliss. 2 7  The
United States Supreme Court adopted his language in 1888 in the
celebrated case of Central National Bank v. Hume,2s and thus
established the rule. Chief justice Fuller stated:
"It is indeed the general rule that a policy, and the money to
become due under it, belong, the moment it is issued, to the person
or persons named in it as the beneficiary or beneficiaries, and that
there is no power in the person procuring the insurance by any
act of his, by deed or by will, to transfer to any other person the
interest of the person named."
The rule of this case has been distinguished on the ground that
it applies only to contracts made in fact with the beneficiary, 2 but
its more general language has become firmly rooted in our law,30
though the rule is said not to exist elsewhere. 31 The English rule
by statute provides only that a husband may insure himself for
the benefit of his wife and children, the policy to enure to them
and to be deemed a trust.3 2 In Canada ordinary third party bene-
ficiaries by statute may be eliminated at will, while beneficiaries
for value, and preferred beneficiaries, a certain group of relatives,
possess something in the nature of a vested right though the in-
251st ed., sec. 317.
26Vance, Insurance, 2nd ed., 554.27Boughton, Creditors and Surrenders, (1926) 3 Ass'n of Life Insur-
ance Counsel Proceedings 311.
28(1888) 128 U. S. 195, 9 Sup. Ct. 41, 32 L. Ed. 370.
29Boughton, Creditors and Surrenders, (1926) 3 Ass'n of Life Insurance
Counsel Proceedings 311. Vorlander v. Keyes, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1924) 1
F. (2d) 67; In re Whiting, (D.C. N.C. 1925) 3 F. (2d) 440.
3°See any digest of cases, such as 37 C. J. 577, 578.
31Vance, Insurance, 2nd ed., 551-553.
3245 & 46 Vict. ch. 75, sec. 11.
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sured may shift the beneficiary designation from one preferred
beneficiary to another.3"
A number of bases for the American view have been given,3 4
but the important fact is that the beneficiary was in effect declared
the owner. Only Wisconsin demurred.35  In the early days of
the rule there were no loan or cash values or annual dividends to
confuse the issue. Under this view of the rights of a beneficiary
the declaration of a policy in trust by naming the trustee bene-
ficiary did not raise any question of testamentary disposition.
The beneficiary took a present existing title to the policy."5
But this view of the courts does not fit the present day con-
cept of a policy as being the property of the insured, and it is
natural that many courts have in the past quarter century taken
the view that if the right is reserved to change the beneficiary
the beneficiary has only contingent rights, some say an expectancy
only, which becomes vested only on the death of the insured.
3 7
But not all courts have unqualifiedly adopted this view. It is not
clear that even a majority have. In fact, there are conflicting deci-
sions in a given jurisdiction. 38 The result has been that many
courts have only reluctantly recognized the rights of the insured
and have held that a third party beneficiary has such rights in a
policy as to require any party dealing therewith, if the interest
of such beneficiary is affected, to deal in accordance with the
terms of the policy.39  The beneficiary is said to have vested
33Foster, The Uniform Life Insurance Laws of the Canadian Provinces,
(1924) 2 Ass'n of Life Insurance Counsel Proceedings 473.34For instance: (1). The statutes authorizing insurance for the benefit
of a wife. 37 C. J. 577 n. (2). The theory of a gift of a chose in action.
(3). The theory of the insured acting as agent for the beneficiary in arrang-
ing for the insurance. (4). The theory of a trust declared by the insured-
promisee when he takes the insurer's promise for the use of the beneficiary.
Vance, Insurance, 2nd ed., 554-556.35Clark v. Durand, (1860) 12 Wis. 223, modified by statute as to mar-
ried women. Wisconsin Statutes, 1898, sec. 2347.3OIn an early North Carolina case, citing Bliss, Life Insurance, 2nd
ed., 517, it was said that a life policy created a vested interest in the bene-
ficiary, and that while the rules for interpreting a will may guide, as far
as they are applicable, in ascertaining the legal effect of a life insurance
clause, there was a difference in that the interest vests under the policy
at once upon its issue, while under a will the interest vests only on the
death of the testator. Hooker v. Sugg, (1889) 102 N. C. 115, 8 S. E. 919.
3737 C. J. 579, 580.
88Holland, Assignment by the Insured of Policies which Reserve to
the Insured the Right to Change the Beneficiary, (1929) 4 Ass'n of Life
Insurance Counsel Proceedings 181.39Holland, Assignment by the Insured of Policies which Reserve to
the Insured the Right to Change the Beneficiary, (1929) 4 Ass'n of Life
Insurance Counsel Proceedings 181.
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rights subject to be divested, but only by the insured's exercising
the power of divestment as agreed.
This rule would prevent an insured, unless the policy ex-
pressly gave him that right, from surrendering a policy, from get-
ting the loan value, from assigning the policy so as to cut out the
beneficiary, and from a mutual rescission, without the consent of
the beneficiary. Under this rule the reservation to the insured of
one of these rights, such as the right to change the beneficiary,
does not carry with it the right to do some other act, such as the
right to elect to take the cash value.40
Where this rule obtains, the naming of a trustee as beneficiary
would create a vested interest, though subject to divestment, in the
trustee, and a question of testamentary disposition should not
arise.4 1 If the assignment method is used, care would have to be
taken to effect transfer of title to the beneficiary, which would un-
doubtedly require, in the absence of a policy provision permitting
an assignment to act as a change of beneficiary, a joinder by any
existing beneficiary or a preliminary change to the insured's
estate.4 2
It is where the view that the beneficiary has contingent or ex-
pectant rights obtains that the problem of testamentary dispositions
principally arises. Where this rule exists, however, if the right
to change the beneficiary is not reserved, the beneficiary is said
to have vested rights," and in such a case, as in the case above
and as under the Huine Case, there would not be any question of a
testamentary disposition. The complainants seeking to invalidate
a life insurance trust in Gurnett v. Mutual Life Insurance Co."4
recognized that this result would follow, if the right to change the
beneficiary had not been reserved.
In this connection, before giving consideration to the theories
and cases having a direct bearing on the testamentary problem,
where the trustee is a third party beneficiary in a state in which
it is said the beneficiary has only expectant or contingent rights, it
4oHill v. Capitol Life Ins. Co., (1932) 91 Colo. 300, 14 P. (2d) 1006;
Grahame, The Rights of a Beneficiary, (1933) 2 Ins. Dec. 318.
4'Note (1933) 46 Harv. L. Rev. 818.
42See Anderson v. Broad Street National Bank, (1918) 90 N. J. Eq.
78, 105 Atl. 599. This is a rule that works both ways: a trustee beneficiary
is not necessarily cut out, completely at least, by assignment even though
the policy is withdrawn from the trust. Bose v. Meury, (1932) 112 N. J.
Eq. 62, 163 Atl. 276.
43 See 7 Cooley, Briefs on Insurance 6399ff.
44(1932) 268 Ill. App. 518.
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must be understood that the problem is essentially one pertaining
to the rights of a third party beneficiary and that only as such
does it affect life insurance trusts. In other words, it is submitted
that if a life insurance policy payable to a third party beneficiary
is not testamentary, a life insurance trust is not, for in both cases
legal title to the insurance funds is given by the policy to the
designated beneficiary. 45 In the case of a trust a split property
interest is involved, but this is a trust problem, not a problem in
wills.
It must also be understood that a life insurance contract is
not in itself testamentary where it is payable to the insured, or to
a party who is the owner and the promisee as a result of being the
only other party to the contract. In the first case the problem could
hardly arise since the policy would always be available for estate
purposes. In the second case ownership rights are always in the
promisee-beneficiary, and they are never in the insured and do not
vest upon his death; the death is merely an event determining the
date of payment.
It is seen that under the old view of the third party beneficiary
as owner, the same result would be reached for the same reason,
namely, that the rights from first to last exist in the beneficiary.4
This view, as previously explained, still obtains in modified form
in many of the states.4 Though the view may be something of an
anomaly, it is indeed not without merit.
Were it not for the above situations being indisputably non-
testamentary, the entire problem could be dismissed because life in-
surance contracts are buttressed by countless statutes which have a
dignity equal to that of the statutes on wills. But as the matter
stands, it may be contended that most of such statutes have ref-
erence only to the clearly non-testamentary life insurance con-
tracts. Some of the life insurance statutes do, however, apply to
all insurance contracts including those alleged to be testamentary,
such as the statutes in the "insured as owner" states, where the
beneficiary has only contingent rights, providing for exemption
from claims of creditors even where the right to change the bene-
45See Bose v. Meury, (1932) 112 N. J. Eq. 62, 163 At. 276, which
pointed out that the trustee took its title to the insurance money under
the policy, and Gurnett v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., (1932) 268 Ill. App. 518,
where the problem was disposed of by holding the trustee to be a donee-
beneficiary.
46Supra note 36.
47Supra notes 38 and 39.
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ficiary is reserved. These statutes would prevent any claim from
being filed by the creditors on the ground that the contract is testa-
mentary and thus void, but they would not prevent the heirs and
legatees from filing a claim. As to this possibility, and as to the
possibility of claims by creditors in states having no exemption or
a limited exemption statute, recourse must be had entirely to gen-
eral principles.
It may be concluded that life insurance trusts as well as life
insurance contracts will not be held to be testamentary even though
the trustee is named as third party beneficiary. Though the author-
ities for the most part are general on both situations, and have not
clearly expounded the legal and historical principles involved, it
would seem there are too many cases upholding and dealing with
both the life insurance trust s and the life insurance contract
49
payable to the third party beneficiary for most courts to take any
view other than to uphold their validity.
The general principle to support the trust or contract theoret-
ically might very well be a general announcement of a strong con-
tingent interest in the beneficiary50 during the lifetime of the
insured which the insured may freely cut off but which exists until
cut off, and which is contingent only because it can be cut off. This
will really be a vested interest subject to easy divestment, rather
than a vested interest subject to most difficult divestment, the rule
obtaining in many states. This interest would be more than a
hope or mere expectancy. It is said that contingent interests may
be assigned in trust.5 In considering this interest the old theory
of beneficiary as owner must not be forgotten as a background for
the strong contingent interest. While it has been often said that
the beneficiary has but an expectant interest52 and on occasion
this interest has been compared to the interest of an heir or
legatee,5 3 it is submitted that "expectant" has generally not been
48Sppra note 16.49See cases in any digest on rights of beneficiaries, such as 37 C. J.
576, 588. It has been declared that a life insurance contract is not testa-
mentary. Martin v. Modern Woodmen of America, (1912) 253 111. 400,
97 N. E. 693; Hooker v. Sugg, (1889) 102 N. C. 115, 8 S. E. 919; John-
ston v. Scott, (1912) 76 Misc. Rep. 641, 137 N. Y. S. 243; Lehman v.
Lehman, (1905) 29 Pa. Super. Ct. 60.5OThe beneficiary's interest is sometimes said to be contingent. See
37 C. J. 580.5
'Perry, Trusts and Trustees, 7th ed., sec. 69; Scott, Trusts and the
Statute of Wills, (1930) 43 Harv. L. Rev. 521, 528 n. 19.
52Vance, Insurance, 2nd ed., 561, 562.53Supreme Council American Legion of Honor v. Gehrenbeck, (1899)
124 Cal. 43, 44 Pac. 640.
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used in this sense, but rather in the sense of "contingent." Some
courts in trying to free the life insurance policy from the strangle-
hold of the theory of the beneficiary having a vested interest have
used language to belittle the beneficiary's interest that was not
necessary or well-considered. Nevertheless their declarations have
been such that it would not be difficult to decide that by expectant
they meant contingent.
The theory of contingent interest was dealt with in -Mrsh v.
Auer54 by the court of appeals of New York in 1895. This case
upheld the life insurance trust. The court said:
"The fact that the trust dealt with a contingent interest of the
insured in the certificate of insurance is of no moment. That in-
terest became vested at the death of the insured, and, the bene-
ficiary having collected the insurance money, the trust, under the
agreement creating and acknowledging it, attached to the fund.
A trust of this character is not to be distinguished from assign-
ments of contingent interests, which courts of equity recognize as
valid."
This case involved a benefit certificate, and the rule as to vested
rights of the beneficiary was never extended to such certificates. 55
Thus, while the court only referred to the insured's contingent in-
terest, any mention of the beneficiary's interest would likewise not
have been to any vested interest of such beneficiary.
In Kerr v. Crane56 the supreme court of Massachusetts in 1912
made a strong pronouncement that a trust of an insurance benefit
certificate could not be avoided on the ground that it was testa-
mentary. This court considered the question from both the in-
sured and the beneficiary angles. It declared:
"It is said that the interests both of the insured member and
of this beneficiary were merely contingent and not actually vested
rights of property in an existing fund. That is true. The amount
of the benefit might never be realized at all. If it were to be
realized, yet the member had no other interest therein than the
bare power to appoint some person of a limited class to receive the
fund if and when it should become due and payable. The bene-
ficiary had no other interest than a mere expectancy dependent
upon the will and pleasure of the insured member. But it does
not follow that the holder of such a merely expected or contin-
gent interest, growing or expected to grow out of actually existing,
though defeasible, contractual rights, has no power of dealing with
it, or that his engagements made with reference to such an inter-
54(1895) 146 N. Y. 13, 40 N. E. 397.
55Vance, Insurance, 2nd ed., 586-588.
56(1912) 212 Mass. 224, 98 N. E. 783.
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est while it is merely expectant and contingent, may not be en-
forced in equity after the interest shall have become vested and
absolute. And it has been so held with reference to just such
contingent and expected rights as are here in question."
It will be noted that the Hirsh and Kerr cases were applying
something more than a rule involving contingent interests, subject
to divestment. They were also applying the rule that equitable
rights attached to the fund when it came into existence. They
were probably not bothered so much by the problem of testamen-
tary dispositions for the insured under a benefit certificate at this
time generally had no cash rights during his lifetime which ceased
or passed on his death. The reasoning of these courts has been
applied to War Risk-Insurance, where the court said:
"Nor are we persuaded that the line of cases against mortgages
on property which has no potential existence applies to the present
case, for, while the trust fund was contingent, it became vested
upon the death of the insured, and became subject to the trust
ingrafted thereupon.15 7
The supreme court of Kansas, however, by a divided court,
laid much stress on the fact that the War Risk Insurance fund was
not in existence, and that an attempted gift was not complete and
executed and beyond the power of revocation."' The court added:
"So far as the elements of a trust entered into the transaction,
it was executory in character and in some respects had the elements
of a testamentary bequest subject to change or revocation without
the consent of those to whom the tentative gifts had been
promised."
And in a Georgia case 9 where the insured had referred by
letter to the disposition of the money to be collected after his death,
the court held that this was not a change of beneficiary or assign-
ment, and that if the money referred to was his property such let-
ter was testamentary. The court refused to create a trust for
the same reason.
These last two cases would seem to require a specific property
interest in the trustee during the lifetime of the insured, but this
should be supplied by an interest vested, subject to divestment,
or a contingent interest, contingent only because it may be revoked.
In view of the many theoretical possibilities, and in view of the
57Lashley v. Lashley, (1924) 212 Ala. 255, 102 So. 229; accord as to
this kind of insurance, Ambrose v. United States, (D.C. N.Y. 1926) 15 F.
(2d) 52; Christensen v. Christensen, (D.C. N.Y. 1926) 14 F. (2d) 475.
58Staples v. Murray, (1928) 124 Kan. 730, 262 Pac. 558.
5OBennett v. Rosborough, (1923) 155 Ga. 265, 116 S. E. 788,
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general rules applying to rights of beneficiaries, it would seem that
the opinions in these cases are unimaginative and will not be gen-
erally controlling. It would be surprising if they were followed
in their own jurisdictions. It has been declared that the trustee
has a present interest.60
Another viewpoint that should be considered in disposing of
this problem, and to reconcile the beneficiary-as-owner and the
insured-as-owner views, is that both the insured and the beneficiary
have different rights in a policy, each independent of the other. A
life insurance contract is of a multiple nature in that it creates a
number of rights. These rights in the modern policies may be
divided into those held by the insured and those held by the bene-
ficiary. The insured has the right to the cash and loan values and
to the dividends, while the beneficiary owns the promise to pay at
death, subject to a right of revocation in the insured. This right
of the beneficiary is of real substance, and is the major right given
in the policy and gives effect to the primary purpose of life insur-
ance. The right to cash and loan values are secondary rights now
required by statute to avoid forfeiture, and arise out of the nature
of the legal reserve system. The right to a dividend is similarly
the result of the cooperative and mutual nature of a conservative
insurance enterprise. A life insurance policy is a very illogical
arrangement indeed divorced from its one great primary obliga-
tion to pay the beneficiary the face amount of the policy on the
death of the insured."' In some respects this dual character of a
life insurance policy is not unlike a life estate to the insured with a
vested remainder to the beneficiary, subject to be divested by the
beneficiary's prior death, or by the insured's revocation.
60Gurnett v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., (1932) 268 Ill. App. 518; John-
ston v. Scott, (1912) 76 Misc. Rep. 641, 137 N. Y. S. 243. The last case
contains the statement: "the trustee had a present title, and the beneficiary
had a vested interest, subject to be divested by the power of revocation."
In other language the court indicated that the insured was in effect trustee
during his lifetime. Cf. infra note 70.
It has been maintained, if the trustee is beneficiary with right of revo-
cation, that during the lifetime of the insured there is no title in the trustee
and that no trust exists. Fraser, Personal Life Insurance Trusts in New
York, (1930) 16 Corn. L. Q. 19, 30. It has also been maintained that in
measuring lives in being you do not therefore need to count any life fintil
insured's death. Remsen, Preparation of Wills and Trusts, 2d ed., 321. But
if the trust is revocable a suspension of alienability may not result. Equit-
able Trust Co. v. Pratt, (1922) 117 Misc. Rep. 708, 193 N. Y. S. 152, aff'd
(1923) 206 App. Div. 689, 199 N. Y. S. 921; Pulitzer v. Livingston, (1896)
89 Me. 359, 36 At. 635; note (1933) 45 Harv. L. Rev. 896.
G1Boughton, Creditors and Surrenders. (1926) 3 Ass'n of Life Insur-
ance Counsel Proceedings 311.
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This rule that the beneficiary, the trustee, does not take any of
the insured's rights, but takes his own, received support in the re-
cent New Jersey case of Bose v. Meury. " -owever, it is not clear
that the court considered that these rights had any existence until
the insured's death, and if this was the case the doctrine of the
Hirsh and Kerr cases, of the trust attaching to the found when it
came into existence, would have to be considered in connection
with such view. However, in view of the staunch support given
by New Jersey to beneficiary rights, the state often holding that
to divest the large rights of the beneficiary the procedure prescribed
in the policy must be followed, it may be assumed that the benefi-
ciary trustee was considered to have had rights during the insured's
lifetime. Even the Bose Case held, as had previous cases, that an
assignment did not divest the beneficiary of his rights.
In considering that the beneficiary had separate rights the
Bose Case declared that the trust is really established by the bene-
ficiary of the policy, the trustee. To the claim that there was no
parting with the subject matter and that the insurance trust was
testamentary, the court said:
"Whatever merit there may be to the points, were the res in
trust the property of the trustor, they are beside the question
where, as here, the res is the proceeds of insurance on the life of
the trustor which never were his property. The proceeds are the
fulfillment of promises by the insurance company to the Mfontclair
Trust Company, trustee, to pay the stipulated sums, upon the death
of the insured. The insured paid the consideration for the prom-
ises and he had the right, under the terms of the policies, to change
the promises at will, but when the day came-the insured's death-
the obligations of the insurance company were due to the Montclair
Trust Company, trustee. Its source of title was the promise in the
policies, not the trust agreement. The trust agreement is no more
than a declaration of trust by the trustee that it would hold the pro-
ceeds of the policies for the benefit of the insured's wife and chil-
dren, and whether it had physical possession of the policies or
whether there was a stripping of interest by the 'donor', or that the
trust deed was testamentary, is wholly immaterial."
Under this language the trust was sustained, but the way was still
left open to contend that the policy, which gave the trustee his
title, was testamentary. But due to the prevailing view in New
Jersey, as indicat.ed above, such a contention would probably be
unsuccessful in that state.
The view that the beneficiary-trustee declares the trust, though
6-2(1932) 112 N. J. Eq. 62, 163 AtI. 276.
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no cases were cited, is not exactly new. Where a trustee has al-
ready been named beneficiary before a trust is declared, it would
appear that the real declaration of trust is by the beneficiary and
not the insured, since title is already in the beneficiary, who is to
be trustee. There are several cases where this would seem to have
been the basis of the trust though no direct mention was made of
such basis."c  In several other cases it is clear that had the bene-
ficiary acted a trust would have been sustained." Several cases
have expressly declared that the trust was declared or recognized
by the beneficiary-trustee.' ;  In the absence of such action the
general rule is applied that the declarations of a grantor to create
a trust must be made prior to, or contemporaneous with, the vest-
ing of rights under the instrument under which the trust is
claimed.66 Some courts have indicated that the basis of the trust,
considering the attitude of the trustee, is something created by the
courts to prevent the trustee-beneficiary from gaining by his
wrong, equity raising a trust ex maleficio against such trusteeY.7
In situations similar to these where the beneficiary-trustee is re-
sponsible for the trust, it is not likely that the trust will be held
testamentary since the trust could be invalidated only by declaring
the policy testamentary.
There is a view related to that expressed in the Bosc Case
which would prevent any possibility of a life insurance contract or
trust from being criticised as testamentary on the usual grounds.
This view is that the insurance fund was never owned by the in-
sured or beneficiary until it accrued to the beneficiary on the death
of the insured, the death being the event which under the contract
G3Devries Estate v. Hawkins, (1903) 70 Neb. 656, 97 N. W. 792;
Alexander v. Woodmen of the World, '(1916) 193 Mo. App. 411, 186 S. W.
2; Levin v. Ritz, (1895) 17 Misc. Rep. 737, 41 N. Y. S. 405.
04Fee v. Wells, (1918) 65 Colo. 348, 176 Pac. 829--"There is no claim
or evidence that the beneficiary declared a trust and constituted herself
trustee." Manley v. Manley, (1901) 107 Tenn. 191, 64 S. W. 8.
65Lashley v. Lashley, (1924) 212 Ala. 255, 102 So. 229--"Moreover,
while it may not have been necessary, the bill charges an express recogni-
tion of the trust by the trustee subsequent to the death of the insured;"
Makowiec v. Prudential Ins. Co., (1929) 83 N. H. 547, 145 Atl. 269.
OGMichigan Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Liphart, (1913) 177 Ill. App. 645;
Bennett v. Rosborough, (1923) 155 Ga. 265, 116 S. E. 788; Fee v. Wells,
(1918) 65 Colo. 348, 176 Pac. 829.
67Coyne v. Supreme Conclave, (1907) 106 Md. 54, 66 Atl. 704. "There
is also a class of trusts which arise ex maleficio, and equity in order to
reach the possessor of what in conscience belongs to another turns him into
a trustee." See also Gurnett v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., (1932) 268 Ill. App.
518: Cockrell v. Cockrell, (1902) 79 Miss. 569, 31 So. 203; Matter of Will
of O'Hara. (1884) 95 N. Y. 403 (not involving insurance trust).
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determined the rights, which rights had no previous existence and
could not possibly pass on insured's death. This view received con-
siderable support in the New York case of Matter of Haedrich.6 s
The court stated that a policy payable to the estate of the insured
was subject to the transfer tax only because
"the proceeds of the transaction are beyond the protecting shield
of public policy, and not, as stated in certain cases, because they
pass under the will or the intestate laws of the state, since the lat-
ter is not the case in any true sense. The right to receive the
money on the insurance in any such case does not pass by will or
intestate laws. The right accrues to individuals who answer a
certain description specified in the contract, but it is not a right
decedent ever possessed, and it is fundamental that non dat qui
non habet."
If the decedent, the insured, never possessed that right, apparently
the beneficiary was not considered as having any rights until the
insured's death, for here the insured was the beneficiary of his
own policy. Under such a view it would make no difference how
bare an expectancy the beneficiary has; his rights would accrue
under contract obligations when a certain event occurs, the death
of the insured, and would never be owned by the insured so as to
pass on his death. This situation would be much like that where
the beneficiary is the owner of the policy, for in such a case the
death merely determines the contract obligations. Under this view
the transaction looks testamentary where there is a third party
beneficiary because the determining event is the death of one of
the contracting parties. It would not look so much this way if the
contract was between A and B to pay C a given sum upon the
death of X.
Due to the fact that one of the most accepted theories as to
the origin of the vested rights of the beneficiary is the theory of
a declaration of trust by the insured, 9 it is somewhat surprising
that there has not been more said in regard to this problem about
the insured acting as trustee during his lifetime, and being super-
seded on his death by the trustee-beneficiary. Thus, it could be
said that if the insured retains extensive rights of ownership,
certain of these are held in trust as declared. A few of the cases
have given some indication of this. In Johnston z. Scott, decided
"s(1929) 134 Misc. Rep. 741, 236 N. Y. S. 395, aff'd (1931) 256 N. Y.
608, 177 N. E. 160.
"Vancc, Insurance, 2nd ed., 551ff.
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by a lower court in New York in 1912,70 the court declared regard-
ing an insurance trust:
"The property is personal; the declaration of .the trust by the
settlor impressed it with a trust character and converted his legal
title to that of trustee for the person for whose benefit the trust
was created."
This is important because the court added in regard to testamen-
tary dispositions:
"That the trust created was not to take effect in possession and
enjoyment until the death of the settlor was because of the nature
and source of the property and the terms of the deed, not because
the deed or transaction was testamentary in character."
In other language, previously referred to, however, the court spoke
of the trustee having a present title.
In another case, where an attempted assignment to children
was frustrated by the company, it was held that such action
amounted to a declaration in trust for the children. The court
said:
"It would be hard to conceive of circumstances that would fur-
nish stronger reasons for the application of the principle of con-
structive delivery and acceptance for the donees by the donor as
their trustee."
Therefore, the insuredwas not permitted to disavow the trust.7 '
In cases of defective assignments in trust the courts have looked
for an intention on the part of the insured to hold himself as trus-
tee.7 2  It has been held that an insured may name his estate in
trust for his heirs, and that the creditors cannot take, and that this
does not.violate the statute of Wills. 73  In such a case any rights
necessary to the existence of the trust during the insured's life-
time would have to be held by him. Where an insured names him-
self in violation of an agreement he is declared a trustee.74  In
England, however, the theory of the insured holding in trust has
made little headway, even to the extent of creating ordinary third
party beneficiary rights.75
Before leaving the problem of a trustee as beneficiary. men-
tion should be made again of the recent case of Gurnett v. Mutual
70(1912) 76 Misc. Rep. 641, 137 N. Y. S. 243.
7'Thompson's Ex. v. Thompson, (1920) 190 Ky. 3, 226 S. W. 350.
72Frost v. Frost, (1909) 202 Mass. 100, 88 N. E. 446.
73Lewis v. Brotherhood Acci. Co., (1907) 194 Mass. 1, 79 N. E. 802.
74Makowiec v. Prudential Ins. Co., (1929) 83 N. H. 547, 145 Atl. 269;
Cockrell v. Cockrell, (1902) 79 Miss. 569, 31 So. 203.
75Vance, Insurance, 2nd ed., 551-552.
THE INSURANCE TRUST
Life Insurance Co.76 The court stated as the basis for upholding
an insurance trust that the legal title during insured's lifetime was
in the trustee because the trustee was donee-beneficiary, even
though the insured reserved the usual rights. The New Jersey cases
requiring the insured to deal in accordance with the terms of the
policy in eliminating the beneficiary were cited with approval,
although apparently there were some Illinois cases that could
hardly be reconciled with this view. The court, though conclud-
ing the trustee was donee-beneficiary, also said the trustee was no
mere beneficiary since it was named pursuant to a contract under
seal and for a valuable consideration. The trustee was found to
have rights as a bailee during the insured's lifetime so as to be
qualified to maintain an action in trover, and to receive the pro-
ceeds. The court thus in a way recognized the dual character of
a life insurance policy, though the insured apparently was not
deemed by the court to have had any rights until he took certain
precedent action.
Policies are quite often placed in trust by assignment. In such
a case, a testamentary problem generally will not arise, but it may
arise if the insured does not complete the assignment, or if the
assignment contains a reservation of substantial rights in the in-
sured. An assignment generally is recognized to be a transfer of
property rights rather than an exercise of a power to appoint.7 7
However, there is not a well defined rule on this subject. Some-
times an assignment is said to cut out the beneficiary. Sometimes
it is said merely to grant -a power to the assignee to change the
beneficiary. Other cases hold it has no material effect on the
beneficiary's rights.7 1 If it is in effect a change of beneficiary, it
is not entirely clear why the insured may not reserve rights as he
does in a beneficiary case without the assignment as such being
testamentary. But in general it may be expected that the courts
will construe an assignment more strictly than they would a desig-
nation of a beneficiary since assignments do not have the exclusive
insurance tradition back of them.
An assignment of a policy normally will be enforced if there
has been delivery for a valuable consideration with the intent to
76(1932), 268 Ill. App. 518, supra notes 44, 45, 60, 67.
"1Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Swett, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1915) 222
Fed. 200.
73Henshaw, Rights of Beneficiaries as Affected by Assignments, (1925)
3 Ass'n of Life Insurance Counsel Proceedings 45.
79Hewins v. Baker, (1894) 161 Mass. 320, 37 N. E. 441.
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vest title in the assignee.7". This is so even though the interest
involved is a contingent interest under a benefit certificate, 0
though there is some indication that it would be necessary to go
into equity to enforce such an assignment.8, Assignments of poli-
cies are not testamentary even though payment is not to be made
until the death of the insured.8 2 However, an assignment which
reserved to the insured the right to make the choice of options
contained in the policy, to receive the whole benefit without the
consent of the assignee, and, in the event of the death of the as-
signee, to have the money payable to his estate, was held testamen-
tary. The court said: "The deceased evidently desired to retain
ownership to the last, and yet deprive his widow of her interest in
his estate. This under our law he could not do."8 3 It was also held
that there had not been any such delivery of the instrument of
assignment or of the policy as was necessary to constitute a trans-
fer of any title legal or equitable. The purported assignee was
declared to be a mere bailee since the papers placed in his posseg-
sion were sealed and the contents thereof were not known to him.
As to the trust involved, the court declared the same to be testa-
mentary since it was not a present trust, divesting the insured of
his ownership. A similar trust, based on assignments, was de-
clared to be testamentary in a Massachusetts case8 ' where the trus-
tees according to the assignment paper were to be named in the
will. 5 The court declared there was no delivery to the assignees
and no intention that the assignor was holding for them.
An assignment to take effect in case the assignee survived the
insured was held to be testamentary in the California case of
Mutual Benefit Life Iis. Co. v. Clark."" In this case there was
neither delivery of the policy nor of the assignment paper to the
assignee, and the right was reserved to the assignor to revoke the
8OKimball v. Lester, (1899) 43 App. Div. 27, 59 N. Y. S. 540, aff'd
(1901) 167 N. Y. 570, 60 N. E. 1113; Dexter v. Supreme Council, (1904)
97 App. Div. 545, 90 N. Y. S. 292.
Sijarvis v. Binkley, (1903) 206 Ill. 541, 69 N. E. 582.
82Southern Mut. Life Ins. Ass'n v. Durdin, (1908) 132 Ga. 495, 64
S. E. 264.
83Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Collaniore, (1905) 100 Me. 578,
62 Atl. 652.
S4Frost v. Frost, (1909) 202 Mass. 100, 88 N. E. 446.
150ne may declare a trust on the back of another's will as on any
writing. Fidelity Tit. & Trust Co. v. Graham, (1918) 262 Pa. St. 273,
105 Ati. 295.
IG(1927) 81 Cal. App. 546, 254 Pac. 306.
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assignment. There is authority contrary to the Clark Case.7 It
may be possible that where certain rights are reserved by the in-
sured under an assignment such an assignment would be approved
on the ground that the insured reserved to himself a life estate
with the vested remainder in the policy contract in the assignee,
subject to be divested by the assignee's prior death or the assign-
or's revocation. This concept is like that suggested regarding the
dual character of the policy contract where the beneficiary's rights
are involved.
In the Gurnett Case, previously mentioned,"" the complainants
conceded that if the policy had been placed in trust by an assign-
ment it would have been proper. However, an assignment can
raise the same difficult questions raised by the change of beneficiary
method.
On the question whether delivery of the policies to the trustee
has any bearing on the testamentary problem, it should be said
that if the trustee is an assignee delivery should be made to com-
plete the assignment and that the trust may be held to be testa-
mentary if there is no delivery. But'where the trustee is named
as beneficiary, there appears no reason why delivery is necessary
here any more than it is in any case when designating a beneficiary
unless it is desired to raise an inference of an oral assignment. In
the Bose Case the court said that whether the trustee had physical
possession of the policies was wholly immaterial. The court in the
Gurnett Case, however, when mentioning the rights of the trustee,
noted that the trustee was a bailee and thus qualified to maintain
an action of trover8 9 Possession of the policy would thus help to
counteract to a certain extent the criticism that the trustee has no
duties to perform during the lifetime of the insured. Withdrawing
policies from the possession of the trustee in revoking the trust
raises no particular problem, as the revocability of a trust does
not per se make the trust testamentary.90
87Burgess v. New York Life Ins. Co., (Tex. Civ. App. 1899) 53 S. W.
602.
s8(1932) 268 Ill. App. 518, supra note 76.
59Horton, Life Insurance Trust Handbook 22.
0°Jones v. Old Colony Trust Co., (1925) 251 Mass. 309, 146 N. E. 716;
Talbot v. Talbot, (1911) 32 R. I. 72, 78 Atl. 535; Robb v. Washington and
Jefferson College, (1906) 185 N. Y. 485, 78 N. E. 359. Cf. Union Trust
Company v. Hawkins, (1929) 121 Ohio St. 159, 167 N. E. 389; Warsco v.
Oshkosh Savings and Trust Company, (1924) 183 Wis. 156, 196 N. W. 829,
holding revocable trusts to be testamentary where it was said the donors
retained full control over the property.
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No doubt there will be many more judicial declarations as to
the problem of the testamentary character of life insurance con-
tracts and trusts. It may be expected, however, that such declara-
tions will follow along the lines of those made in the past," such
as have been discussed here. Considering the trust origin of the
rights of a beneficiary, and the later modifications in favor of
the insured, a policy of insurance may be said to contain the ele-
ments of a mixed trust with rights in the beneficiary and as such
will not be held to be testamentary. 2 While the courts must be on
their guard against a trust device in order to prevent evasion of
the statute of wills so that creditors and heirs and the tax inter-
est of the state may be protected, it should be noted that there is no
special necessity for any such alertness in the insurance trust situ-
ation since the insured-settlor has been able to employ, and no
doubt will continue to employ, the regular insurance arrangement
without regard for creditor, heir or tax. The insurance trust is
employed solely in the normal case for its administrative utility.
OSee note (1933) 46 Harv. L. Rev. 818.
92Professor Percy Bordwell of the College of Law, State University of
Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa, wrote on April 19, 1933 to the author as follows:
" . . . independently of authority, my reaction is that when a beneficiary is
named there are the distinct elements of a trust in a life insurance policy,
substantially, I mean, and not merely technically; and I think that it would
be very advantageous to have that idea gotten over to insurers in general.
It's a sort of mixed trust though, for where the insured has a right to make
loans, and in these days I should say the word "puny" is inadequate to
describe that right, he has a self-interest that would ordinarily be incon-
sistent with a trust. But I would say it is a new trust development and is
just another example of the many forms the trust principle can take. If
there are the elements of a trust, I don't believe there is much reason to
question the validity of the transaction because of its mere testamentary
character. There is nothing sacred about the requirements of the statute
of frauds and wills, and my own reaction is that, if there is no obvious
attempt to get away from the provisions of the statute of frauds and wills,
one shouldn't worry too much about the testamentary character of the
transaction. And if there are really trust elements involved, that is enough
to my mind to answer the question of testamentary character . . . These
are just off-hand reactions for what they are worth."
